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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Sherman R. Maxwell appeals from the judgment and restitution order
entered upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of grand theft; defacing,
destroying or obliterating a motor number; and knowingly selling or offering for
sale a vehicle with a defaced, destroyed or obliterated motor number.

On

appeal, Maxwell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his grand
theft conviction. He also contends that the indictment was improperly amended
to allege offenses different than those considered by the grand jury. Finally, he
challenges the award of restitution as it relates to his grand theft conviction.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
James and Diana Witherspoon owned and operated Small Block
Enterprises, Inc. (hereinafter "Small Block"), a business engaged in the buying,
refurbishing and reselling of automobiles. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.4, L.12 - p.5, L.22; Tr.,
Vol. VI, p.47, L.8 - p.48, L.8.

1

)

Maxwell owned Von Zipper's Custom Cycles

(hereinafter "Von Zipper's"), a custom motorcycle and vehicle repair business.
(Tr., Vol. IV, p.7, Ls.10-14; Tr., Vol. VI, p.334, L.13 - p.335, L.10.) In the spring
of 2004, James Witherspoon approached Maxwell about "fixing up" a Corvette.
(Tr., Vol. IV, p.6, Ls.1-21.) Thereafter, the Witherspoons, d/b/a Small Block, and
Maxwell, d/b/a Von Zipper's, agreed to join forces to purchase, refurbish and

1

The appellate record contains several separately bound volumes of transcripts.
For uniformity and ease of reference, the state has adopted the numbering and
citation system used by Maxwell in his Appellant's brief. (See Appellant's brief,
p.2 n.2 (designating the separately bound transcripts by volume number).)
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resell a number of vehicles.

(Tr., Vol. VI, p.130, L.18 - p.135, L.20, p.336,

Ls.16-20, p.338, L.23 - p.340, L.12.)

Pursuant to the agreement, which was

never reduced to writing, the Witherspoons were to front Maxwell the money to
purchase vehicles at auction, Maxwell was to repair the vehicles and resell them,
and the Witherspoons were to share in the proceeds of the sales and/or, at the
very least, recover the money they had invested in the vehicles. (Tr., Vol. VI,
p.131, L.2-p.140, L.1, p.340, Ls.7-12.)
One of the first projects on which the Witherspoons and Maxwell
collaborated was a custom motorcycle.

(Tr. Vol. IV, p.7, L.18 - p.9, L.1.)

Maxwell falsely represented to the Witherspoons that he had a manufacturer's
license and he told James Witherspoon that, if the Witherspoons supplied the
money to buy the necessary parts, Maxwell could build a custom motorcycle
from the ground up and the parties could sell it for between $20,000 and $50,000
and split the profits. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.7, L.21 - p.9, L.8, p.17, Ls.15-19; Tr., Vol. VI,
p.52, L.4 - p.53, L.22; see also Tr., Vol. VI, p.248, Ls.1-8, p.362, L.22 - p.363,
L.8 (Maxwell did not have a manufacturer's license in the spring of 2004).) He
also told the Witherspoons, apparently as an alternative to the profit sharing
arrangement, that the Witherspoons could buy the completed motorcycle for
$15,000 and make a good profit selling it.

(Tr., Vol. VI, p.53, Ls.12-16.)

Ultimately, the Witherspoons purchased a number of parts for the motorcycle,
including a $3,541.40 Harley Davidson motor (Tr., Vol. IV, p.9, L.9 - p.12, L.5;
States Exhibits 1 and 2), a $250-$300 ignition (Tr., Vol. IV, p.16, Ls.19-24), and
$2,342.89 worth of miscellaneous parts from Ted's Cycle (Tr., Vol. IV, p.12, L.14
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- p.13, L.13; State's Exhibit 3). They also made numerous loans to Maxwell,
including a $5,000 loan that either was to be repaid by deducting that amount
from Maxwell's share of the profits of the sale of the motorcycle to a third party,
or was to serve as a payment by the Witherspoons toward the purchase price of
the motorcycle. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.14, L.21-p.16, L.7, p.38, L.22-p.39, L.17, p.41,
Ls.4-11; Tr., Vol. VI, p.33, L. 10 - p.34, L.25, p.54, Ls.6-21; State's Exhibit 4
($5,000 cashier's check made payable to Maxwell and drawn on the account of
the Witherspoons' primary business, Witherspoon Homes, Inc.); Defendant's
Exhibit F (promissory note securing $5000 loan).)
On April 30, 2004, when the motorcycle was nearly complete, Maxwell
signed over the title of the motorcycle to James and Diana Witherspoon, noting
on the Certificate of Title a selling price of $7,000. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.17, L.23 p.21, L.25, p.32, L.17 - p.34, L.3; Tr., Vol. VI, p.35, Ls.1-19, p.38, L.18 - p.40,
L.9; State's Exhibit 5.) Maxwell and James Witherspoon also executed a Bill of
Sale, which also listed a selling price of $7,000. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.22, Ls.10-14,
p.38, Ls.2-18; Tr., Vol. VI, p.32, L.24 - p.33, L.9, p.63, L.14 - p.64, L.17.)
James Witherspoon took the Certificate of Title and Bill of Sale to the OMV and
registered the motorcycle in his and his wife's names. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.22, Ls.122, p.40, Ls.21-24; Tr., Vol. VI, p.58, Ls.20-23.)

A few days later, Diana

Witherspoon transferred the title to the Small Block corporation. (Tr., Vol. IV,
p.22, L.22 - p.23, L.4, p.40, L.25 - p.41, L.3; Tr., Vol. VI, p.58, L.25 - p.59,
L.10.)

3

Approximately two or three weeks after receiving the title and registering
the motorcycle in their corporate name, the Witherspoons took physical
possession of the motorcycle. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.18, L.23 - p.19, L.9; Tr., Vol. VI,
p.42, L.8 - p.43, L.4, p.56, L.9 - p.58, L.14.)

James Witherspoon took the

motorcycle to his own shop and stored it there for "[a] couple of weeks." (Tr.,
Vol. IV, p.18, L.23 - p.19, L.9; Tr., Vol. VI, p.64, L.18 - p.85, L.18.) He knew
when he did so that the motorcycle "still needed a few things" such as a steering
stop and a carburetor adjustment. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.19, Ls.10-20; Tr., Vol. VI, p.56,
L.9 - p.57, L.24.)
In the late part of May or early part of June 2004, James Witherspoon
took the motorcycle back to Maxwell's shop and left it there so that Maxwell
could make the necessary adjustments.

(Tr., Vol. IV, p.19, L.21 - p.20, L.3,

p.23, L.21 - p.25, L.16; Tr., Vol. VI, p.85, L.16 - p.86, L.7.)

When James

Witherspoon stopped by Maxwell's shop a few days later the transmission and
some other parts were missing from the motorcycle. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.25, L.21 p.27, L.2; Tr., Vol. VI, p.86, Ls.8-21.) When asked why he had begun taking the
motorcycle apart Maxwell responded that the Witherspoons "owed him for all
those parts." (Tr., Vol. IV, p.27, Ls.3-17.) James Witherspoon left Maxwell's
shop believing, based on the condition of the motorcycle and Maxwell's
statements, that Maxwell had no intention of giving him back the motorcycle.
(Tr., Vol. IV, p.27, L.18 - p.28, L.2.)
On several occasions between June and July of 2004, the Witherspoons
demanded that Maxwell return the motorcycle to them, but Maxwell refused to do

4

so.

(Tr., Vol. IV, p.25, L.7-p.29, L.10; Tr., Vol. VI, p.86, L.8-p.88, L.11.)

Around that same time, Maxwell sold at least two other vehicles in which the
Witherspoons had invested and did not share the proceeds of those sales with
the Witherspoons.

(Tr., Vol. VI, p.129, Ls.3-16, p.135, Ls.6-10, p.138, L.23 -

p.140, L.1, p.366, L.24 -

p.267, L.19.)

The Witherspoons attempted,

unsuccessfully, to formalize their business agreement with Maxwell and to hold
him accountable for the repayment of the Witherspoons' initial investment in any
vehicles they purchased as part of their business arrangement with Maxwell.
(Tr., Vol. VI, p.130, L.18 - p.131, L.1, p.140, L.25 - p.142, L.4; Defendant's
Exhibit Q.)

Maxwell rejected the Witherspoons' proposed business plan and

indicated a desire to terminate his business relationship with them. (Tr., Vol. VI,
p.369, L.10 - p.370, L.7; Defendant's Exhibit S.) The Witherspoons agreed to
terminate the relationship and requested that Maxwell release all claim to any
vehicles the Witherspoons had purchased and, in exchange, the Witherspoons
agreed to pay Maxwell for the work he had done on those vehicles. (Tr., Vol. VI,
p.143, L.2 -

p.147, L.5; Defendant's Exhibit T.)

The Witherspoons also

requested that Maxwell turn over to them the "2003 Renegade motorcycle that
[the Witherspoons] purchased and [Maxwell] ... failed to deliver." (Defendant's
Exhibit T.) Nothing came of these attempted negotiations. (Tr., Vol. VI, p.370,
Ls.8-11.)
A few days after sending Maxwell their proposal for terminating the
business relationship, the Witherspoons, accompanied by a "police standby,"
again went to Maxwell's shop in an attempt to recover their motorcycle. (Tr., Vol.
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IV, p.28, Ls.12-24; Tr., Vol. VI, p.86, L.23 - p.87, L.17.)

Maxwell "got pretty

hostile" and told the police that the Witherspoons "hadn't paid for [the
motorcycle] and he had a lien on it and several other things that were untrue."
(Tr., Vol. VI, p.86, L.23 - p.87, L.17; see also Tr., Vol. IV, p.29, Ls.1-5.) The
Witherspoons left Maxwell's shop without the motorcycle.

(Tr., Vol. IV, p.29,

Ls.8-15.) Several days later, Diana Witherspoon sent Maxwell a written demand
for repayment of the $5,000 the Witherspoons (d/b/a Witherspoon Homes, Inc.)
had loaned Maxwell in May 2004.

2

(Tr., Vol. IV, p.39, Ls.18-23; Tr., Vol. VI,

p.121, Ls.10-24; Defendant's Exhibit U.) Maxwell never repaid the loan. (Tr.,
Vol. VI, p.36, L.9 - p.37, L.4, p.121, Ls.22-25.)
In mid-July 2004, Maxwell moved out of his shop and took the
Witherspoons' motorcycle with him. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.29, L.11 - p.30, L.1; Tr., Vol.
VI, p.88, L.12 - p.92, L.3.) The Witherspoons did not see the motorcycle again
until they were contacted in August by a gentleman named Phil Neff. (Tr., Vol.
VI, p.92, Ls.5-21.)

Mr. Neff had purchased the motorcycle from Maxwell for

$8,100 but was unable to title it because the identification number on the motor
had been gouged out and could not be matched to the manufacturer's certificate
of origin that Maxwell had provided to Mr. Neff at the time of the sale. (Tr., Vol.
VI, p.172, L.8 - p.188, L.6, p.212, L.3 - p.213, L.14, p.230, Ls.13-22, p.237, L.22

2

As previously set forth, the Witherspoons understood when they made the loan
that Maxwell would repay it either by deducting $5,000 from his share of the
profits of the sale of the motorcycle to a third party, or by applying the $5,000
toward the Witherspoons' purchase of the motorcycle. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.14, L.21 p.16, L.7, p.38, L.22 - p.39, L.17, p.41, Ls.4-11; Tr. Vol. VJ, p.33, L.10 - p.34,
L.25, p.54, Ls.6-21, p.61, L.20 - p.61, L.1.)
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- p.245, L.2, p.293, L.9 - p.295, L.5, p.296, L.14 - p.297, L.16.)

Mr. Neff

attempted to get his money back from Maxwell, but Maxwell said he did not have

.
the money.

(Tr., Vol. VI, p.186, L.25 - p.187, L.12.)

Mr. Neff kept the

motorcycle and, in a continued effort to title it, made numerous attempts to
obtain from Maxwell documentation showing that Maxwell had built the
motorcycle. (Tr., Vol. VI, p.190, L. 14 - p.192, L.15.) Maxwell never responded
to Mr. Neff's requests. (Tr., Vol. VI, p.192, Ls.16-17.)
Mr. Neff subsequently read in the newspaper that the Witherspoons "had
a motorcycle stolen;" Maxwell's name appeared in the same article. (Tr., Vol. VI,
p.195, Ls.5-15.)

Suspecting there was a connection, Mr. Neff contacted the

Witherspoons and showed them the motorcycle Maxwell had sold to him. (Tr.,
Vol. VI, p.32, Ls.1-8, p.92, L.8 - p.93, L.10, p.195, L.5 - p.196, L.4.) With the
3

possible exception of the frame and other miscellaneous parts, it was the same
motorcycle, with the same engine, that Maxwell had built as part of the
agreement with Small Block and for which he had signed over the title to the
Witherspoons. (Tr., Vol. VI, p.93, Ls.5-8, p.196, L.2 - p.198, L.14, p.393, Ls.2024, p.402, Ls.7-10.) The Witherspoons thereafter filed an insurance claim on the
stolen motorcycle and received from the insurance company (National Indemnity
Company) a check in the amount $15,044.11 to compensate Small Block for the

3

Maxwell admitted at trial that the motorcycle he sold to Phil Neff was the same
motorcycle he was building with the Witherspoons. (Tr., Vol. VI, p.393, Ls.21-24,
p.402, Ls.7-12.)
However, the evidence suggests that, before selling the
motorcycle to Mr. Neff, Maxwell replaced the frame of the motorcycle with a
frame constructed by a different manufacturer and bearing a different VIN than
the VIN under which the Witherspoons had titled and registered the motorcycle.
(Tr., Vol. VI, p.267, L.21 - p.270, L.5, p.275, L.2 - p.276, L.1.)
7

value of its loss. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.31, L.21 - p.32, L.10, p.34, Ls.4-14; Tr., Vol. VI,
p.111, L.1 -p.112, L.7, p.163, Ls.21-23; Defendant's ExhibitV.)
A grand jury indicted Maxwell for grand theft, altering a vehicle
identification number (VIN), and selling or offering for sale a vehicle with a
defaced, destroyed, or obliterated VIN. (R., Vol. I, pp.13-15.) Maxwell moved to
dismiss the indictment, contending the evidence presented to the grand jury was
not sufficient to establish probable cause to believe that Maxwell committed the
charged offenses. (R., Vol. I, pp.22-23, 51-59; see generally Tr., Vol. II, p.4, L.3
- p.32, L.24 (1/5/06 hearing on motion to dismiss).) Specifically, in addition to
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a probable cause finding on
the grand theft charge, Maxwell also argued that the evidence presented to the
grand jury showed only that the motor number of the motorcycle had been
destroyed, not the VIN as alleged in Counts II and Ill of the indictment. (R., Vol.
I, pp.51-59; Tr., Vol. II, p.13, L.23 - p.32, L.24.)

In response to Maxwell's

challenge to Counts II and Ill of the Indictment, the state requested that it be
permitted to amend the indictment to conform to the evidence presented to the
grand jury. (R., Vol. I, pp.93-94.) The district court denied Maxwell's motion to
dismiss and permitted the state to amend Counts

11

and

111

of the indictment to

allege, respectively, that Maxwell defaced, destroyed or obliterated a motor
number, and that he sold or offered for sale a vehicle with a defaced, destroyed
or obliterated motor number, concluding that such amendments would neither
charge a different offense nor prejudice Maxwell's substantial rights. (R., Vol. I,
pp.125-27; Tr., Vol. II, p.49, L.9 - p.52, L.9, p.55, Ls.1-8.)

8

The state filed its amended indictment (erroneously captioned a Second
Amended Indictment) on March 24, 2006. (R., Vol. I, pp.128-30.) On January
16, 2007, Maxwell, through new counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the amended
indictment, arguing that Counts II and Ill alleged crimes different than those
presented to the grand jury. (R., Vol. I, pp.168-75.) The district court denied the
motion on the alternative bases that the issues raised therein had already been
argued and "properly decided," the motion was untimely and, finally, the motion
lacked "substantive merit because no new offense is charged and the defendant
has not shown any prejudice." (R., Vol. II, pp.215-16.)
The case proceeded to trial on April 9, 2007. (See R., Vol. 11, pp.219-311
(minutes of four-day jury trial).) At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found
Maxwell guilty of all three charges alleged in the amended indictment. (R., Vol.
11, pp.312-14.)

The district court imposed an aggregate unified sentence of

seven years, with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed
Maxwell on probation for seven years. (R., Vol. II, pp.337-42.) After a series of
hearings over period several years, the court also ordered Maxwell to pay
restitution as follows:

$500 to the Witherspoons; $519 to Mr. Neff; and

$15,044.11 to National Indemnity Company. (1/27/11 "Amended" Order To Pay
Restitution As A Condition Of Probation (augmentation); 1/27/11 "Amended" Civil
Judgment (augmentation).)
Maxwell timely appeals. (R., pp.345-47, 354-59.)

9

ISSUES
Maxwell states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was sufficient evidence offered at Mr. Maxwell's trial to
sustain his conviction for grand theft?

2.

Did the district court err in allowing the State to amend the
indictment to allege different offenses than those considered
by the grand jury?

3.

Did the district court err in its computation of the restitution
owed to National Indemnity?

(Appellant's brief, p.17.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was there substantial, competent evidence presented at trial from which
the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Maxwell was guilty of grand
theft?

2.

Has Maxwell failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
permitting the state to amend Counts II and Ill of the indictment?

3.

Has Maxwell failed to show error in the district court's restitution
determination?

10

ARGUMENT
I.
There Was Substantial. Competent Evidence Presented At Trial To Support The
Jury Verdict Finding Maxwell Gutlty Of Grand Theft
A.

Introduction
Maxwell challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his grand

theft conviction.

Specifically, he contends that the state failed to present

substantial, competent evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Witherspoons were the "owners" of the motorcycle he was alleged to have
stolen.

(Appellant's brief, pp.18-31.)

Maxwell's argument is without merit. A

review of the record and the applicable law shows that the state presented
substantial, competent evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
Witherspoons had possessory rights in the motorcycle that were superior to any
possessory rights that Maxwell had at the time of the alleged wrongful taking
and, as such, were "owners" of the motorcycle for purposes of the grand theft
statutes.

B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered

upon a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v.
Hart, 112 ldaho759, 761,735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct.App.1987). In conducting
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the
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reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121
Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1

1); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at

1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho
698, 701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735
P.2d at 1072.

C.

The State Presented Substantial. Competent Evidence That The
Witherspoons Had Possessory Rights Superior To Those Of Maxwell And
Were Thus The "Owners" Of the Motorcycle
Count I of the amended indictment charged Maxwell with grand theft, in

violation of I.C. §§ 18-2403(1) and 18-2407(1)(b). (R., Vol. I, pp.128-29.) For
Maxwell to be guilty of that offense, the Witherspoons must have been the
"owners" of the 2003 Renegade custom motorcycle Maxwell was charged with
wrongfully taking.

See

I. C. § 18-2403(1) ("A person steals property and

commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate
the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds
such property from an owner thereof.") (emphasis added); State v. Bennett, 150
Idaho 278, 279-80, 246 P.3d 387, 388-89 (2010). (See also Jury Instruction No.
13 (elements instruction requiring state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Diana and/or James Witherspoon were the owners of the motorcycle).)

For

purposes of the theft statutes an "owner" of property is "any person who has a
right to possession thereof superior to that of the taker, obtainer or withholder."
I. C. § 18-2402(6).

(See also Jury Instruction No. 18 (instructing on statutory

definition of "owner).) Thus, to prove the grand theft charge, the state had the
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burden of proving that the Witherspoons had possessory rights in the motorcycle
superior to any possessory rights Maxwell may have had at the time of the
alleged wrongful taking. Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280, 246 P.3d at 389. Contrary
to Maxwell's assertions on appeal, a review of the record and the applicable law
shows that the state carried its burden.

1.

The State Presented SubstantiaL Competent Evidence From
Which The Jury Could Conclude That Maxwell Relinquished All
Possessory Rights To The Motorcycle When He Executed A Bill Of
Sale And Transferred Title And Possession To The Witherspoons

In State v. Bennett, 150 Idaho 278, 280, 246 P.3d 387, 389 (2010), the
Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the definition of "owner" in I.C. § 182402(6) "depends on the possessory rights of the persons involved." Because
"the criminal code does not provide guidance on possessory rights," the Bennett
Court examined Articles 2 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) to
determine the relative possessory rights of a purchaser and seller of goods.
Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280, 246 P.3d at 389. Specifically, the Court looked to the
UCC to determine whether a defendant charged with stealing a travel trailer (for
which he had made partial payment and which was in his possession at the time
of the alleged wrongful taking) had possessory rights in the trailer inferior to
those of the seller (who had retained title to the trailer).

&

Ultimately, the Court

determined that the seller "was not the 'owner' of the trailer, because he ...
parted with possession [of the trailer by delivering it to Bennett] and had no
security interest entitling him to repossession of the trailer upon Bennett's
default."

&

Because the evidence showed that "the superior possessory right
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resided with Bennett at the time that [the seller] delivered the trailer to him
without retaining any legally supported secured interest," the Court found the
evidence insufficient to sustain Bennett's grand theft conviction.

kl

Bennett presents an inverse factual scenario than that presented by this
case; the analysis therein is controlling and requires that Maxwell's grand theft
conviction be affirmed. This is so because, contrary to Maxwell's assertions on
appeal, the state presented substantial, competent evidence from which the jury
could conclude that Maxwell sold the motorcycle to the Witherspoons without
retaining any security interest therein and, in so doing, relinquished his
possessory rights.
James Witherspoon testified that he and Maxwell entered into a verbal
agreement to build the motorcycle at issue in this case. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.6, L 10 p.9, L.8, p.37, L.24 - p.38, L.1.) Pursu~nt to the terms of the agreement, the
Witherspoons (d/b/a Small Block) were to purchase necessary parts and
Maxwell (d/b/a Von Zipper's) was to supply some parts and perform the labor.
(Tr., Vol. IV, p.7, L.18 - p.9, L.8, p.17, Ls.2-8.)

When the motorcycle was

complete, James Witherspoon was supposed to sell it and share the profits with
Maxwell.

{Tr., Vol. IV, p.9, Ls.2-6; Tr., Vol. VI, p.35, Ls.20-25.) Diana

Witherspoon testified that she was not personally involved in the formation of the
agreement.

{Tr., Vol. VI, p.52, Ls.4-12.)

However, she was present when

Maxwell told the Witherspoons that they could buy the motorcycle from him and
make a good profit selling it. (Tr., Vol. VI, p.53, Ls.7-16.)
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Ultimately, the Witherspoons purchased over $6,000 worth of parts for the
motorcycle, including a $3,541.40 Harley Davidson motor. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.9, L.9
- p.12, L.5, p.12, L.14 - p.13, L.13, p.16, Ls.19-24; State's Exhibits 1-3.) They
also loaned Maxwell $5,000. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.14, L.21 - p.15, L.4, p.38, Ls.22 p.39, L.3, p.41, Ls.4-7; Tr., Vol. VI, p.34, Ls.18-20, p.54, Ls.6-21; State's Exhibit
4; Defendant's Exhibit F.)

James Witherspoon testified that Maxwell was to

repay the loan by deducting $5,000 from his share of the profits of the sale of the
motorcycle to a third party. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.15, Ls.5-8, p.38, L.22 - p.39, L. 17.)
Diana Witherspoon believed the $5,000 was to serve as a payment toward the
Witherspoon's purchase of the motorcycle.

(Tr., Vol. VI, p.54, Ls.6-21.)

Regardless, the state's evidence shows that Maxwell signed over the title of the
motorcycle to the Witherspoons in April 2004, when the motorcycle was nearly
complete. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.17, L.23 - p.21, L.25, p.32, L.17 - p.34, L.3; Tr., Vol.
VI, p.35, Ls.1-19, p.38, L.18 - p.40, L.9; State's Exhibit 5.) At the same time,
Maxwell executed a Bill of Sale showing that James Witherspoon had purchased
the motorcycle for $7,000. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.22, Ls.10-14, p.38, Ls.2-18; Tr., Vol.
VI, p.32, L.24 - p.33, L.9, p.63, L.14 - p.64, L.17.) The title also noted a selling
price of $7,000. (State's Exhibit 5.) The Witherspoons subsequently titled and
registered the motorcycle in Small Block's name and, two or three weeks later,
they took physical possession of the motorcycle. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.18, L.23 - p.19,
L.9, p.22, L. 1 - p.23, L.4, p.40, L.21 - p.41, L.3; Tr., Vol. VI, p.42, L.8 - p.43,
L.4, p.56, L.9 - p. 59, L.10.)
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Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the above evidence
constitutes substantial, competent evidence from which the jury could reasonably
conclude that Maxwell sold the motorcycle to the Witherspoons.

Maxwell

devotes great effort on appeal to attacking Diana Witherspoon's testimony,
contending it is not competent evidence of a sale because it was not consistent
with her husband's testimony and, in some instances, was not based on her own
personal knowledge.

(See Appellant's brief, pp.4-6 n.4, pp.20-21.)

Maxwell's

argument fails because the credibility of Mrs. Witherspoon's testimony, and the
weight to be accorded thereto, were matters exclusively within the province of
the jury. ~ . State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241,255,192 P.3d 1065, 1079 (2008);
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103-04, 175 P.3d 788, 792-93 (2008); State v.
Jones, 145 Idaho 639, 641, 181 P.3d 1247, 1249 (Ct. App. 2008). Moreover,
while Mrs. Witherspoon's understanding of the details of the agreement may
have differed from that of her husband's in some respects, it was not
inconsistent with what actually transpired.

Both Witherspoons testified that

Maxwell executed a Bill of Sale, signed over the Certificate of Title and,
ultimately, delivered possession of the motorcycle to the Witherspoons.
Combined, these actions display all the hallmarks of a sale. 4

4

See State v.

Maxwell asserts on appeal that the state below "conceded the Witherspoons
did not have a superior right of possession based on a purchase of the
motorcycle." (Appellant's brief, p.21 (citing State's Response to Defendant's
Motion for New Trial and Supporting Brief, pp.4-6 (May 6, 2010).) No such
concession appears in the cited material. The state below noted that, after the
Witherspoons paid a substantial amount of money toward the motorcycle,
Maxwell signed over the title and delivered possession, thereby relinquishing any
possessory rights. (State's Response To Defendant's Motion For New Trial And
Supporting Brief, pp.4-6 (augmentation).) This argument is entirely consistent
16

Henninger, 130 Idaho 638, 641, 945 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1997) (sale of
vehicle evidenced by installment sale contract executed by both parties and
delivery from seller to buyer of possession and documents necessary to transfer
title).
Because the evidence shows that Maxwell sold the motorcycle to the
Witherspoons, the relative possessory rights of the Witherspoons and Maxwell
are governed by the UCC and Bennett, supra. See I.C. § 28-2-102 (UCC applies
to transactions involving the sale of goods). Just like the seller in Bennett who
"parted with possession of the trailer by delivering it to Bennett," 150 Idaho at
280, 246 P.3d at 389, Maxwell parted with possession of the motorcycle by
delivering it the Witherspoons; and, unlike the seller in Bennett, he did so after
signing over the title. Also unlike the seller in Bennett, Maxwell did not even
attempt to retain a legally enforceable security interest in the motorcycle, either
by retaining the title before delivering the motorcycle to the Witherspoons,
Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280, 246 P.3d at 389 (citing I.C. §§ 28-2-401(1) and 28-9110 (retention of title effects reservation of security interest "until the debtor
obtains possession of the goods")), or by creating a security agreement that
meets the requirements of I.C. § 28-9-203(b), see Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280,
246 P.3d at 389 (after debtor obtains possession of the goods, any security
interest asserted by the seller, to be enforceable, must meet the requirements
set forth in I.C. § 28-9-203(b)(3)).

with the state's argument on appeal and the evidence, which supports a jury
finding that Maxwell sold the motorcycle to the Witherspoons.
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Because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the state,
shows that

Maxwell

delivered

both

possession

of the

motorcycle

and

unencumbered title thereto to the Witherspoons no later than June 2004, there
can be no question that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding
that the Witherspoons had possessory rights in the motorcycle superior to those
of Maxwell, and were thus the "owners" of the motorcycle for purposes of I.C. §
18-2402(6). See Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280, 246 P.3d at 389 (seller did not have
superior possessory right because he parted with possession and had no
enforceable security interest entitling him to repossess the trailer upon Bennett's
default of payment).

That the Witherspoons subsequently delivered the

motorcycle to Maxwell for the installation of a steering stop and a carburetor
adjustment does not change the analysis. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.19, L.10 - p.20, L.3,
p.23, L.21 - p.25, L.16; Tr., Vol. VI, p.57, Ls.9-24, p.85, L.16 - p.86, L.7.)
Having previously been given both title and possession, the Witherspoons were
the "owners" of the motorcycle when they delivered it to Maxwell's shop for what
the evidence shows was the limited purpose of performing necessary repairs.

5

5

Maxwell argues that, in order to be entitled to return of the motorcycle, the
Witherspoons were required to have retained some security interest in it.
(Appellant's brief, pp.27-31.) Maxwell is incorrect. The evidence shows it is
Maxwell who relinquished all possessory rights to the motorcycle when he sold it
to the Witherspoons. If Maxwell wished to retain a possessory interest, it was he
who was required to retain a security interest before transferring title and
possession to the Witherspoons. See Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280, 246 P.3d at
389. Without such interest, Maxwell was not any more entitled to deprive the
Witherspoons of their motorcycle than a repair shop would be to deprive a
customer of his or her vehicle that the customer brought in for service.
18

(Tr., Vol. IV, p.19, Ls.21-25, p.23, L.21 - p.24, L.11; Tr., Vol. VI, p.85, L.16 p.86, L.7.) Even if the Witherspoons still owed Maxwell money (either for the
labor and parts he contributed to the motorcycle, or for his share of the profits of
any future sale of the motorcycle by the Witherspoons to a third party), Maxwell
did not have the right to take and withhold the motorcycle from the Witherspoons
and, ultimately, sell it to another person. See Bennett, 150 Idaho at 280, 246
P.3d at 389 (unsecured seller did not regain superior possessory rights upon
buyer's default of payment); Henninger, 130 Idaho at 641, 945 P.2d at 867
(same). The evidence supports the jury's finding that, by so doing, Maxwell was
guilty of grand theft.

See I.C. § 18-2403(1) ("A person steals property and

commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate
the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds
such property from an owner thereof.").

2.

The State Presented Substantial, Competent Evidence That The
Motorcycle Was Neither Partnership Nor Joint Venture Property

Maxwell argues for the first time on appeal that the evidence supports a
finding that the business relationship between the Witherspoons (d/b/a Small
Block) and himself (d/b/a Von Zipper's) constituted a legal partnership or,
alternatively, a joint venture.

(Appellant's brief, pp.24-27.)

He also contends

that, as a partner or a participant in the joint venture, he "had just as much right
to possess and/or sell the motorcycle as did the Witherspoons" because, he
contends, the motorcycle was partnership or joint venture property. (Appellant's
brief, p.25; see also Appellant's brief, p.27 ("Maxwell contends his right to
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possess, or even sell, the motorcycle in furtherance of the joint venture was
equal to that of the VVitherspoons (Small Block).").) Maxwell has failed to show
any basis for reversal of his grand theft conviction because, even assuming a the
jury could have found the existence of a partnership or joint venture had they
been so instructed, 6 the state presented substantial, competent evidence that
the motorcycle was neither partnership nor joint venture property.
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act, I.C. § 53-3-101, et seq., defines
"partnership property" as follows:
53-3-204. When property is partnership property. - (a) Property
is partnership property if acquired in the name of:
(1) The partnership; or
(2) One (1) or more partners with an indication in the instrument
transferring title to the property of the person's capacity as a
partner or of the existence of a partnership but without an indication
of the name of the partnership.
(b) Property is acquired in the name of the partnership by a
transfer to:
(1) The partnership in its name; or
(2) One (1) or more partners in their capacity as partners in the
partnership, if the name of the partnership is indicated in the
instrument transferring title to the property.
(c)
Property is presumed to be partnership property if
purchased with partnership assets, even if not acquired in the
name of the partnership or of one (1) or more partners with an
indication in the instrument transferring title to the property of the
person's capacity as a partner or of the existence of a partnership.
(d) Property acquired in the name of one (1) or more of the
partners, without an indication in the instrument transferring title to
6

The state does not concede that the jury should have been so instructed, nor
does Maxwell raise an instructional error claim on appeal.
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the property of the person's capacity as a partner or of the
existence of a partnership and without use of partnership assets, is
presumed to be separate property, even if used for partnership
purposes.
I.C. § 53-3-204.

"Ultimately, it is the intention of the partners that controls

whether property belongs to the partnership or to one or more of the partners in
their individual capacities .... " I.C. § 53-3-204 (Official Comment at

~

3);

also Murgoitio v. Murgoitio, 111 Idaho 573, 576, 726 P.2d 685, 688 (1986)
(holding under former version of Uniform Partnership Act that "ultimate
determination of whether an asset is partnership property depends on the
parties' intent"); Shumway v. Shumway, 106 Idaho 415, 421, 679 P.2d 1133,
1139 (1984) (same).
Applying these principles to the evidence in this case shows that the
motorcycle Maxwell was charged with stealing was not partnership property.
There was no evidence that the motorcycle was "acquired in the name of the
partnership," either by a transfer of the motorcycle to the "partnership in its
name," or by a transfer to one of the partners "in their capacity as partners" with
the name of the partnership being "indicated in the instrument transferring title to
the property."

I.C. § 53-3-204(b).

To the contrary, the evidence shows that

Maxwell signed over the title of the motorcycle to the Witherspoons, in their
individual capacities, and the Witherspoons thereafter titled the motorcycle in the
name of Small Block, a corporation in which Maxwell had no interest. (Tr., Vol.
IV, p.17, L.23 - p.21, L.25, p.22, L.22 - p.23, L.4, p.32, L.17 - p.34, L.3, p.40,
L.25 - p.41, L.3; Tr., Vol. VI, p.35, Ls.1-19, p.38, L.18 - p.40, L.9, p.58, L.25 p.59, L.1 O; State's Exhibit 5.) Because the motorcycle was not "acquired in the
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name of the partnership," it did not meet the definition of partnership property in
subsection (b).
The motorcycle likewise did not meet the definition of

partnership

property in subsection (c) because, contrary to Maxwell's argument on appeal, it
was not "purchased with partnership assets."

I.C. § 53-3-204(c).

Maxwell's

entire argument that the motorcycle was partnership property rests on his claim
that "when Von Zippers and Small Block contributed parts clearly intended to be
used in the motorcycle, those parts became the property of the partnership; as a
result, the finished product - the completed (or partially completed), motorcycle was the property of the partnership as well." (Appellant's brief, pp.24-25 (citation
omitted).) Maxwell's argument is without merit. Even assuming Maxwell and the
Witherspoons were partners, there is no evidence that the parts they contributed
to the motorcycle were purchased with partnership assets. Rather, the evidence
shows that Maxwell and the Witherspoons each used their own separate assets
(or the assets of their respective corporations) to contribute and/or purchase the
parts that went into the building of the motorcycle. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.9, L.9 - p.12,
L.5, p.12, L.14, p.13, L.13, p.16, Ls.19-24, p.17, Ls.2-8; State's Exhibits 1-3.) In
fact, there is a complete dearth of evidence to suggest that the partnership, if
there was one, had any shared assets to contribute to the project.

The

motorcycle was not partnership property as defined by subsection (c).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence presented at
trial only reasonably supports the conclusion that the motorcycle was not
partnership property. Subsection (d) of section 53-3-204 specifically creates a
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presumption that property acquired in the name of one or more of the partners,
without an indication on the title of their capacity as partners and without use of
partnership assets, is that partner's separate property. See also LC. § 53-3-204
(Official Comment at~ 3.) The state presented evidence in this case that, after
the motorcycle was nearly complete, Maxwell transferred the title directly to the
Witherspoons, in their individual capacities, and the Witherspoons subsequently
transferred the title to Small Block. (Tr., Vol. IV, p.17, L.23 - p.21, L.25, p.22,
L.22 - p.23, L.4, p.32, L.17 - p.34, L.3, p.40, L.25- p.41, L.3; Tr., Vol. VI, p.35,
Ls.1-19, p.38, L.18 - p.40, L.9, p.58, L.25 - p.59, L.1 O; State's Exhibit 5.)
Because, as explained above, the motorcycle was not purchased with any
partnership assets, and because there was no indication on the title either that
title was being transferred to the Witherspoons and/or Small Block in their
capacities as partners or even that a partnership existed, it must be presumed
that the motorcycle was the Witherspoons' and/or Small Block's separate
property. I.C. § 53-3-204(d). This presumption is consistent with the intent of
the parties, as testified to by James Witherspoon, that Maxwell was only entitled
to half of the profits of the sale of the motorcycle, not to the motorcycle itself.
(Tr., Vol. VI, p.35, L. 1
Comment at

~

p.36, L.23, p.38, Ls.1-8.) See 1.C. § 53-3-204 (Official

3) (whether property belongs to partnership or to one or more

partners in individual capacities is ultimately a question of parties' intent).
Substantial evidence thus supports a finding that the motorcycle was not
partnership property.

23

For similar reasons, the evidence presented at trial also supports a finding
that, even if the business relationship between the Witherspoons and Maxwell
could be properly characterized as a joint venture, the motorcycle was not an
asset of the joint venture at the time Maxwell was alleged to have stolen it. "A
joint venture is analogous to a partnership and is defined as an association of
two or more persons to carry out a single enterprise for profit." Saint Alphonsus
Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. Krueger, 124 Idaho 501, 507, 861 P.2d 71, 77
(Ct. App. 1992) (citing Rhodes v. Sunshine Mining Co., 113 Idaho 162, 166, 742
P.2d 417, 421 (1987)).

"Joint ventures and partnerships are governed by the

same basic legal principles," with one exception being that, unlike a partnership,
"a joint venture is not a legal entity separate from its participants." 59 Am. Jur.
2d Partnership § 14 (2011); accord Costa v. Borges, 145 Idaho 353, 357, 179
P.3d 316, 320 (2008) (citing Clawson v. General Ins. Co. of America, 90 Idaho
424, 431, 412 P.2d 597, 601 (1966)). It is generally recognized that participants
in a joint venture enjoy, among other things, "a joint property interest in the
subject matter of the venture." Rhodes, 113 Idaho at 166, 742 P.2d at 421; see
also Stearns v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 284-85, 240 P.2d 833, 838-39 (1952),
quoted in Rhodes, 133 Idaho at 166, 742 P.2d at 421, ("It is immaterial in whose
name the property is acquired in a joint venture, as one holding title is a trustee
for those who are so engaged in the joint enterprise.").

However, as with

partnership law, whether property belongs to the joint venture or is the personal
property of one or more of the joint venture participants appears to be a matter of
the parties' intent.

See Costa, 145 Idaho at 358-59, 179 P.3d at 321-22
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(applying presumption of I.C. § 53-3-204(c), i.e. that property is partnership
property if purchased with partnership assets, to determine whether property in
dispute belonged to joint venture and concluding it did based, in part, on actions
of joint venture participant in claiming property as joint venture property on tax
returns).
Application of these legal principles to the evidence presented by the state
in this case shows that the motorcycle was not joint venture property.

As

previously stated, the evidence shows that Maxwell and the Witherspoons each
contributed their own assets to the building of the motorcycle.

Once the

motorcycle was built, Maxwell transferred title and possession of it to the
Witherspoons in their individual capacities, with the Witherspoons subsequently
transferring the title to Small Block. James Witherspoon testified that, at that
point, he was the one who was supposed to sell the motorcycle and, if he sold it,
his only obligation to Maxwell was to share the profits of the sale. (Tr., Vol. VI,
p.35, L.1 understanding

p.36, L.23, p.38, Ls.1-8.)
was

that,

upon

receiving

Diana Witherspoon testified her
the title

and

possession,

the

Witherspoons owned the motorcycle free and clear. (Tr., Vol. VI, p.83, L.23 p.84, L.11.)

Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the state

supports a finding that the motorcycle was not joint venture property; if Maxwell
had any interest after he transferred title and possession to the Witherspoons,
such interest was only in a share of the profits of any future sale of the
motorcycle, not in the motorcycle itself.
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The state presented substantial, competent evidence that the motorcycle
Maxwell stole was neither partnership nor joint venture property, but was instead
the sole property of the Witherspoons. Because the evidence supports a finding
that the possessory rights to the motorcycle rested exclusively with the
Witherspoons, Maxwell has failed to show any basis for reversal of his grand
theft conviction.

3.

Even If The Motorcycle Was Partnership Or Joint Venture Property,
The Witherspoons Still Held An Interest In The Motorcycle To
Which Maxwell Was Not Entitled

Even assuming the motorcycle was partnership or joint venture property,
the state still presented substantial, competent evidence to support the jury's
finding that the Witherspoons had the superior possessory rights to the
motorcycle under the facts of this case.

Idaho Code § 18-2406 specifically

states that "[i]t is no defense to a charge of theft of property that the offender has
an interest therein, when the owner also has a interest to which the offender is
not entitled."

While Maxwell may have had rights equal to those of the

Witherspoons to use or possess the motorcycle on behalf of the partnership or in
furtherance of the joint venture, the evidence shows that he did neither and
instead diverted the motorcycle for his personal gain.

In so doing, Maxwell

wrongfully deprived the Witherspoons of their possessory interest in the
motorcycle, an interest to which Maxwell was not entitled.
The reasoning of State v. Kuntz, 875 P.2d 1034 (Mont. 1994), is
instructive.

Kuntz, a managing partner in KMMC Investments Partnership,

diverted for his own personal use "thousands of dollars of partnership funds."

26

kl

at 1035. On appeal from his felony theft conviction, Kuntz argued that "as the
managing partner of KMMC, he had actual authority to exert control over the
property in question, and therefore, cannot be held criminally liable for theft of
partnership property."

~

The Supreme Court of Montana disagreed.

~

at

1035-36. Like Idaho's theft statutes, the statute under which Kuntz was charged
required the state to prove that Kuntz took (or, in that case, exerted unauthorized
control over) property from the "owner."

~

(citing M.C.A. § 45-6-301 (1 )(c)

(1991 )). Also like Idaho's theft statute, the Montana theft statute provided that
"[i]t is no defense to a charge of theft of property that the offender has an interest
therein when the owner also has an interest to which the offender is not entitled."
~

at 1036 (citing M.C.A. § 45-6-303(1) (1991 )).

The court rejected Kuntz'

"assertion that there can be no part of partnership property to which a partner is
not 'entitled,"' and, citing Montana's Uniform Partnership Act, explained:
Even though we previously stated that § 35-10-502(2), MCA
(1991 ), of Montana's UPA does not create or define a crime, this
section makes clear that a partner's property right only extends to a
partner's use of that property for partnership purposes and that
there is "no right to possess such property for any other purpose
without the consent of the other partners." Therefore, even though
Kuntz has an interest in KMMC's property, he was not entitled to
divert property for personal use without the knowledge and consent
of the other partners.
~

at 1036.

Because Montana's "laws governing property rights in partnership

property do establish that a partner's entitlement to partnership property is
limited," the court held that "a partner can be liable for theft of partnership
property" and, ultimately, affirmed Kuntz' conviction.

~

Accord State v.

Sylvester, 516 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Iowa 1994) (partner held criminally liable for
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embezzling partnership assets); State v. Larsen, 834 P.2d 586, 590-91 (Utah
App. 1992) (partner could be held criminally liable for exercising unauthorized
control over partnership property).
Idaho's laws governing property rights in partnership property similarly
establish that a partner's entitlement to partnership property is limited.
Specifically, I.C. § 53-3-401 (g) provides:

A partner may use or possess

partnership property only on behalf of the partnership.

(Emphasis added).

Likewise, as Maxwell appears to acknowledge on appeal (see Appellant's brief,
p.27), the right of a participant in a joint venture to use and possess the property
joint venture property is limited to the use and possession of the property in
furtherance of the joint venture. See Rhodes v. Sunshine Mining Co., 113 Idaho

162, 742 P.2d 417 (1987) (participants in joint venture share "a joint property
interest in the subject matter of the venture and a right of mutual control or
management of the enterprise" (emphasis added)). There can be no question
based on the evidence presented at trial that Maxwell was not acting either on
behalf of the partnership or in furtherance of the joint venture when he withheld
the motorcycle from the Witherspoons, dismantled it and, ultimately, sold it to a
third party without sharing the proceeds.

Because Maxwell did not have any

right to possess the motorcycle for other than partnership or joint venture
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purposes, the Witherspoons necessarily held the superior possessory rights to
the motorcycle when Maxwell diverted it for his own personal gain. 7
Construing the facts and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
facts in light of upholding the jury's verdict, the state presented substantial,
competent evidence from which the jury concluded that the Witherspoons had
possessory rights in the motorcycle superior to any possessory rights that
Maxwell had at the time of the alleged wrongful taking and, as such, were
"owners" of the motorcycle for purposes of the grand theft statutes. Maxwell's
conviction must therefore be affirmed.

11.
Maxwell Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Order Granting
Amendment Of The Indictment
A.

Introduction
The evidence presented to the grand jury established that Maxwell ground

off the identification number on the engine of the motorcycle and then sold the
motorcycle. (Tr., Vol. I, p.47, L.5 - p.58, L. 16, p.71, L.17 - p.81, L.20.) The
grand jury indicted Maxwell on one count of "altering vehicle identification" for
defacing, destroying or obliterating "a motor vehicle identification number on a
2003

Renegade

custom

motor

cycle

7

vehicle

identification

number

If a partnership had been created, then, under Idaho's Revised Uniform
Partnership Act, Maxwell was "not a co-owner of partnership property and [had]
no interest in partnership property which [could] be transferred, either voluntarily
or involuntarily." I.C. § 53-3-501. If a partnership had been created, then
Maxwell, by selling the motorcycle and pocketing the proceeds, stole the
motorcycle from its owner, the partnership.
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1V9HC26573C109012" in violation of

I.C. § 49-1418(3). (R., Vol. I, pp.13-14

(capitalization altered).) The grand jury also indicted Maxwell on one count of
"selling or offering for sale a vehicle with defaced, destroyed, or obliterated
identification number" for selling or offering for sale "a 2003 Renegade custom
motor cycle from which the vehicle identification number had been defaced
and/or destroyed and/or obliterated" in violation of I.C. § 49-1418(4). (R., Vol. I,
pp.13-14.) The district court granted the state's motion to amend the indictment
to conform to the evidence presented to the grand jury by replacing references to
the vehicle identification number in the indictment with "a motor number,
manufacturer's number, or parts number on a motor or engine" and "the motor or
engine number," respectively, in the amended indictment. (Compare R., Vol. I,
pp.13-14 with R., Vol. I, pp.128-29.)
Maxwell argues that a vehicle identification number is a different than a
motor number, and therefore the amendment charged different acts (and
therefore a new crime). (Appellant's brief, pp.34-38.) Maxwell misperceives the
amendment. The state did not amend the indictment to charge a different act;
the state amended the language of the indictment to more closely match the
evidence and accurately state the acts for which Maxwell was indicted.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether amendment of an indictment was proper is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. I.C. § 19-1420; State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 655 P.2d
46 (1982); State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 645, 22 P.3d 116, 120 (Ct. App.
2001 ).
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C.

Changing The Language Of The Indictment From Vehicle Identification
Number To Motor Identification Number To More Accurately State The Act
Committed By Maxwell Did Not Charge A Different Offense
The district court may grant the state's motion to amend an indictment

after entry of the plea and before the state rests at trial so long as the
amendment does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant or charge
a different offense. I.C. § 19-1420; I.C.R. 7. An amendment does not charge a
different offense where the facts added or changed through amendment do not
allege a crime separate from the one originally charged. See State v. LaMere,
103 Idaho 839, 842 n.4, 655 P.2d 46, 49 n.4 (1982) (amending information from
forcible rape to statutory rape did not allege a different crime); State v. Owens,
101 Idaho 632, 638-39, 619 P.2d 787, 792-93 (1979) (amendment to better
describe stolen property did not charge different offense); State v. Palmer, 138
Idaho 931, 936-37, 71 P.3d 1078, 1083-84 (Ct. App. 2003) (amending the
amount of methamphetamine trafficked from 28 to 400 grams did not charge a
different offense because only one act of trafficking was involved); State v.
Seiber, 117 Idaho 637, 638-39, 791 P.2d 18, 19-20 (Ct. App. 1990) (amending
information from grand theft to grand theft by unauthorized control over stolen
property did not allege different offense because stealing the property and
possessing it thereafter are "the same crime"); State v. Banks, 113 Idaho 54, 5657, 740 P.2d 1039, 1041-42 (Ct. App. 1987) (amending information from forcible
rape to statutory rape did not charge different crime because there was only one
rape).
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Here there was only one crime per count: the crime of obliterating the
identification number on the engine (Count 11) and thereafter selling the
motorcycle with the obliterated number (Count Ill).

The amendment merely

changed the name of the number obliterated to clarify that it was a motor
number, not a vehicle identification number.

Maxwell was not charged with

obliterating a different number or selling a different motorcycle with the
amendment. The same crimes under the same code sections were alleged in
both the indictment and the amended indictment. Because there was only one
crime at issue, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
clarification that the crime Maxwell committed involved a motor number instead
of a vehicle identification number.
The amendment in this case is analogous to the amendment in State v.
Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 935 P.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1997). In that case the district
court allowed the prosecution to amend the charge alleging Owen stole a JennAir "refrigerator" to allege he stole a Jenn-Air "range."

lsl

at 933, 935 P.2d at

197. Owen's argument that this amendment was error had "no merit."
934, 935 P.2d at 197.

lsl

at

In addition to the issue not being preserved, the

amendment merely conformed the pleading to the evidence presented both at
trial and in the preliminary hearing "showing that the property subject to the
alleged theft was a range, not a refrigerator."

lsl

Likewise here, the amendment

was merely to conform to the evidence that the number Maxwell obliterated
before selling the motorcycle was a motor number, not a vehicle identification
number.
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Maxwell argues that the amended indictment alleged a different criminal
act than the original indictment alleged, and a different crime than the grand jury
considered.
analysis.

(Appellant's brief, pp.34-38.)

This argument does not withstand

The criminal acts for which Maxwell was originally indicted were

obliterating a number on the engine of a motorcycle and then selling that
motorcycle with an obliterated number on the engine. The only change was in
the name given the object of those acts-the number itself. By amending the
information to correctly identify the number in question the state did not charge
different acts or different crimes.

Maxwell has therefore failed to show any

abuse of discretion by the district court in allowing the amendment.

111.
Maxwell Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Order Of Restitution
A.

Introduction
Among other restitution, the district court ordered Maxwell to pay

$15,044.11

to AIC

Witherspoons' insurer.

National

Indemnity Co.

(hereinafter "National"), the

(1/27/11 "Amended" Order to Pay Restitution As A

Condition Of Probation (augmentation).) Although he acknowledges this is the
amount National paid the Witherspoons for their economic loss resulting from
the theft, he claims that $5,000 of that amount was the result of insurance fraud
by Mrs. Witherspoon, and therefore the district court erred by not reducing the
restitution by that amount.

(Appellant's brief, pp.40-42.)

without merit.
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This argument is

8.

Standard Of Review
The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will not be

disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687,
692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007). The trial court's application of the law
to the facts of the case, however, is subject to free review on appeal.
Roberts v. State, 132 Idaho 494, 496, 975 P.2d 782, 784 (1999); State v.
Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659,661, 67 P.3d 1271, 1273 (Ct. App. 2002).

C.

Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court's Finding That National
Paid The Victims $15,044.11 For Losses Associated With Maxwell's Theft
Insurers who pay for losses are, by definition, "victims" for purposes of

restitution. I.C. § 19-5304(a). They are entitled to recover their out-of-pocket
expenses in reimbursing the victims pursuant to contract. I.C. § 19-5304(a).
Restitution should be paid to insurers who have reimbursed the direct victims of
crime

absent evidence "that the

insurance payments were

inflated or

unreasonable in relation to the [losses the defendant] caused." State v. Taie,
138 Idaho 878, 879-80, 71 P.3d 477, 478-79 (Ct. App. 2003).
On appeal Maxwell contends that National overpaid by $5,000 "because
of Mrs. Witherspoon's misrepresentations," and that the evidence instead shows
the $5,000 loss was from a loan unrelated to the motorcycle. (Appellant's brief,
p.41.) This argument was not presented to the district court. (Tr., Vol. VIII, p.
89, L.7 - p.90, L 15 (arguing that adjuster did not do enough to ascertain value
of motorcycle and that Maxwell's relative inability to pay should mitigate the
amount). As such it is unpreserved for appeal.
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"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved
for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _ , 245
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 896, 894 P.2d
125, 129 (1995)). Nor will Idaho's appellate courts "review a trial court's alleged
error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling which forms the
basis for the assignment of error." State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d
942, 946 (1993); see also State v. Olson, 138 Idaho 438, 442, 64 P.3d 967, 971
(Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231, 235, 985 P.2d 111, 115
(1999)).

Because the district court was never asked to determine whether

National had overpaid because the $5,000 was a loan wholly independent of the
motorcycle, there are no findings of fact on this point.

Maxwell has failed to

preserve this issue for appellate review.
Even if preserved, Maxwell's argument is without merit. The entirely of his
argument depends on this Court making a determination that Mrs. Witherspoon
made "misrepresentations."

(Appellant's brief, p.41.)

This argument fails

because the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony,
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within
the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d
108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). The evidence in this case was that the $5,000 the
Witherspoons paid Maxwell was either a loan to be repaid from the proceeds of
the anticipated sale of the motorcycle to a third party or served as a down
payment by the Witherspoons on the purchase of the motorcycle from Maxwell.
(Tr., Vol. IV, p.14, L.21 - p.16, L.7, p.38, L.22 - p.39, L.17, p.41, Ls.4-11; Tr.,
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Vol.VI, p.33, L.10 - p.34, L.25, p.54, Ls.6-21, p.61, L.20 - p.61, L.1.) Either way,
Maxwell's theft deprived them of this money because the Witherspoons would
have recouped it upon sale of the motorcycle Maxwell stole. Maxwell's argument
that the $5,000 was a loan unrelated to the motorcycle requires this Court to
ignore a great deal of evidence that would otherwise support the district court's
order.

As such, Maxwell has failed to show clear error in the district court's

factual findings. The district court's restitution order should be affirmed because
it is supported by substantial, competent evidence.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and
amended order of restitution.
th

DATED this 19 day of December 2011.
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